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Corporations
By

WILLBURT

D. HAM*

The Corporations section of the present Survey overlaps
with the one published during 1975.1 Consequently, there are
no new Kentucky corporation cases which have not already
been the subject of comment. During the 1974-75 period, however, the United States Supreme Court handed down several
decisions of interest affecting federal corporation law, and the
flow of cases in other states continued unabated. It seems appropriate, therefore, to discuss three of the particularly relevant Supreme Court decisions, along with several cases from
other jurisdictions which interpret and apply statutory provisions similar to those in the Kentucky Business Corporation
2
Act.
I.

A.

FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW

SEC Rule 10b-5.

The most noteworthy of the three Supreme Court cases
was Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,3 in which the
Court approved the purchaser-seller standing requirement for
damage suits brought under SEC Rule 10b-5.4 This SEC rule,
prohibiting fraudulent or deceptive conduct in the purchase or
sale of securities,5 was adopted by the Securities and Exchange
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, University of Illinois; J.D.
1940, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
1 63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1975).
2 Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 271A (Supp. 1974)[hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
The full text of the rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a materal fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
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Commission in 1942 under the authority of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.0 Prior to 1942 there were statutory
provisions in the Securities Acts sufficient to reach fraudulent
conduct perpetrated by sellers on the buyers of securities, 7 but
there were no provisions sufficient without Commission implementation to protect ordinary sellers of securities from fraudulent conduct by buyers.' Rule 10b-5 was adopted by the Commission to fill this gap? Since that time Rule 10b-5 has enjoyed
such an expansive application that it has rapidly become the
dominant force for policing misconduct in corporate securities
transactions. 0 It has even invaded the corporate mismanagement field, normally considered an area reserved for the application of state fiduciary law principles."
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The full text of the section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any 'means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
Although the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. 780(c)(1970)
covers fraudulent practices involved in both the purchase and sale of securities, it
relates only to such conduct by brokers and dealers.
' For the gap-filling origins of the Rule, see Proceedings, Conference on Codification of Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks by Milton
Freeman).
0 Professor Alan Bromberg has remarked: "[The Rule] is by now such a dominant factor in private securities litigation that one is surprised when it does not turn
up, and a court does not hesitate to introduce it as a major consideration if plaintiff
fails to plead it." A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.5(6)
(1973).
1 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), which
involved the embezzlement of 5 million dollars from Manhattan Casualty Co. by two
individuals who had acquired the ownership of the company from its former owner,
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. The funds embezzled, which were used to pay loans the
two had obtained to enable them to purchase the stock of Manhattan from Bankers
Life, had arisen from the sale of a quantity of U.S. Treasury Bonds held by Manhattan
as an investment. There was no fraud involved in the market sale of the bonds, and,
therefore, no fraud in that sense in connection with the purchase and sale of a security.
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One restraining influence which has kept Rule 10b-5 from
making even further inroads into state fiduciary duty law has
been the application by the courts of the purchaser-seller
standing requirement first enunciated in 1952 by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 2
In that case the court refused to permit a mere shareholder in
a corporation to maintain a Rule 10b-5 suit for damages, either
as a class action or derivatively, for alleged misconduct on the
part of the controlling shareholder in selling his interest to
outside parties at a premium. 3 The court concluded that Rule
10b-5 was intended to apply only to plaintiffs who were defrauded purchasers or sellers of stock. The standing requirement thus enunciated in Birnbaum has been generally adhered
to in other circuits," including the Sixth Circuit.'" Although it
has suffered some attrition, mainly through an expansive interpretation of "purchasers" or "sellers" of stock within the meaning of the rule," at the time of the Blue Chip Stamps decision,
only the Seventh Circuit had rejected it outright. 7
However, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said that it was sufficient if the
fraud touched the sale of securities. Id. at 12-13.
12 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
13The controlling stockholder, Feldmann, who was also president and a director
of the corporation involved, Newport Steel Corporation, had sold his controlling interest to a syndicate of endusers of steel products in a period of short supply. Shortly
before the sale of his interest to the syndicate, Feldmann rejected an offer from Follansbee Steel Corporation for a merger of Follansbee with Newport which, on the terms
proposed, would have benefited all the stockholders of Newport. There were allegations
that Feldmann and other named defendants had made certain misrepresentations in
letters sent to the stockholders of Newport, both at the time of the negotiations with
Follansbee, and later, after Feldmann's sale of his stock to the syndicate. Id. at 462.
" See A. JACOBS, THE IhiPAcT OF RULE 10b-5 § 38.01(d) n.10 (1974).
11Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
(1971).
11See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (transfer of stock in a
merger); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967) (forced sale as result of short form merger). See also James v. Gerber Prods.
Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973)(beneficiary of testamentary trust treated as having
standing to sue for trustee's alleged wrongful sale of shares held by the trust).
11See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). The present discussion of the Birnbaum standing
requirement relates only to private civil suits for money damages. It has been held
inapplicable to suits for injunctive relief. See Mutual Shares Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 384
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). This position on injunctive relief can be traced to a Supreme
Court decision involving the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, in which the Court had
said: "It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all
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In Blue Chip Stamps the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied one of the recognized exceptions to the Birnbaum
standing requirement, the "aborted" purchaser doctrine.'" The
case involved, however, a rather significant extension of that
doctrine. The exception originated in cases involving actual
contracts to purchase stock in which the seller had later negotiated a sale to others resulting in a breach of contract with the
original buyer.' 9 In the Blue Chip Stamps case, there were prospective purchasers of stock who had been persuaded not to
buy, but there were no contracts to purchase which had been
breached. The suit was brought as a class action for damages
by Manor Drug Stores, a nonshareholder customer of Blue
Chip Stamp Company, charging the company with intentionally preparing and distributing an overly pessimistic prospectus designed to discourage the nonshareholder customers from
purchasing stock at bargain prices under an antitrust consent
decree. It was alleged that this was done so that the rejected
shares could then be sold to the public at a higher price. The
district court dismissed the complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the complaint, analogizing
the consent decree to a contract of purchase. 2' The Supreme
Court granted Blue Chip's petition for certiorari, 2 and reversed
23
the court of appeals in a 6-3 decision.
The majority of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, approved the Birnbaum standing requirement as a
proper interpretation of Rule 10b-5, based on the Rule's legislative history and on the policy of curtailing the dangers of vexatious litigation, to which the majority felt Rule 10b-5 was pecuthe elements required in a suit for monetary damages." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).

" See Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
I!d.

20 Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
2, Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974). Judge

Hufstedler contended in a vigorous dissenting opinion that the nonpurchasing plaintiffs in Blue Chip Stamps were no different from other nonshareholder, nonpurchasing
members of the public who were later offered securities under the same consent decree.
Id. at 146.
22 419 U.S. 992 (1974).

2 95 S.Ct. at 1935.
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liarly susceptible. 24 The Court rejected as unsound the analogy
drawn by the court of appeals between a consent decree and a
contract to purchase, pointing out that by definition in the
Securities Exchange Act the terms "buy" and "purchase" include "any contract to buy. ' 25 In a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, emphasized that the textual makeup of the various antifraud provisions of the securities acts, including the language of 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, support the Birnbaum rule.2 1 Mr. Justice
Blackmun wrote a vigorous dissent, in which Justices Douglas
and Brennan concurred, strongly criticizing the majority opinion for ignoring the broad, general intent of Congress, as manifested by the Securities Acts, to protect the investing public
from fraudulent practices affecting their stock interests.
Nevertheless, this decision will probably slow somewhat the
further extension of federal corporation law through Rule lOb5 into the corporate mismanagement area.2
B.

The Williams Act

The second of the Supreme Court decisions, Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp.,21 involved a significant interpretation of
the filing requirements of § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.30 Section 13(d), which was added to the Exchange
Act as a part of the Williams Act amendments in 1968,31 per24Id. at 1925-32. The Court also emphasized the longstanding judicial acceptance
of the Birnbaum rule and the failure of Congress to reject the rule. Id. at 1924.
21 Id. at 1932-35. Section 3(a)(13) of the Act provides: "The terms 'buy' and
'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(13)(1970). The Court noted that a consent decree is not enforceable by those
not parties to it, though they may be benefited by it. 95 S. Ct. at 1932.
2195 S. Ct. at 1935-37.
2,Id. at 1937-42.
21For a discussion of Rule 10b-5 as applied to corporate mismanagement cases,
see Cox, Fraud is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule lOb-5's Application to Acts of
CorporateMismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 674 (1972).
2995 S. Ct. 2069 (1975).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
3,Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454. One of the stated purposes
of the Williams Act was to require the disclosure of pertinent information and afford
other protections to stockholders "when a person or group of persons seeks to acquire
a substantial block of equity securities of a corporation by a cash tender offer or
through open market or privately negotiated purchases." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1968). For an overview of the Williams Act and the additions it made to
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tains to acquisition of substantial blocks of stock in public
companies. As implemented by SEC Rule 13d-1, 32 it requires
any person acquiring more than five percent of a class of stock
of a public company 33 to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC, the
target company and each stock exchange where the security is
traded. The schedule must contain certain specified information concerning the acquisition, including a statement as to the
purpose of the acquisition.34
Rondeau, a Mosinee, Wisconsin, businessman, began
making substantial purchases of the common stock of Mosinee
Paper Corporation during April, 1971. By May 17, 1971, he had
acquired more than 5 percent of the Mosinee common stock.
Although he was then obligated to file a Schedule 13D, he
failed to do so, contending that he was unaware that such a
filing was required of him at that particular time. 5 Rondeau
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and
Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAw. 1637 (1971).
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1, -101 (1975).
3 Public company refers to those companies required to register their securities
pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Such companies include those
whose securities are listed for trading on a national securities exchange, and, since the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, those whose securities are traded over-thecounter, if they have assets in excess of $1,000,000 and a class of stock (equity securities) held of record by 500 or more persons. See 15 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
34 The relevant portion of § 13(d)(1) reads:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial
ownership of any equity security . . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after
such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its principal executive
office, by registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement containing such of
the following information, and such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors . ...
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970).
Among the items of information referred to in § 13(d)(1) is one designated "(C)",
which provides that if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to
acquire control of the business of the issuer of the securities, the buyer is to state any
plans or proposals which he or those associated with him may have "to liquidate such
issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any other persons, or to make any other
major change in its business or corporate structure." 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(1)(c) (1970).
However, the Commission in Rule 13d-1 requires the purpose of the purchases or
proposed purchases to be disclosed, regardless of whether that purpose relates to
changes in control. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 to -101 (1975).
1 95 S. Ct. at 2074. The district court accepted Rondeau's testimony that he
believed when he made his purchases that the filing of a Schedule 13D was not required
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continued to purchase Mosinee stock until July 30, 1971, when
he was notified by the company that his purchases seemed "to
have created some problems under the Federal Securities
Laws." 36 Rondeau stopped making any further purchases, consulted an attorney, and on August 26, 1971, filed a Schedule
13D. Mosinee Paper Corporation then instituted a suit in federal district court seeking, inter alia, to enjoin Rondeau from
voting or pledging his Mosinee Stock."
The district court granted a summary judgment against
Mosinee, concluding that Rondeau had committed only a technical violation of the Williams Act and that the violation had
not resulted in damage to the corporation. 8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to enjoin Rondeau from
further violations of the Williams Act and from voting, for a
period of 5 years, any shares of Mosinee stock purchased between the due date of Schedule 13D and the date of its actual
filing.39 The court of appeals concluded that failure to file a
timely Schedule 13D had injured Mosinee by delaying its preparation of any response it might have wished to make to Rondeau's potential to obtain control of the company." The court
also ruled that the traditional requirement of a showing of irreparable harm as a prerequisite for obtaining permanent injunctive relief was inapplicable to target companies under the Williams Act, since such companies were in the best position "to
assure that the filing requirements of the Williams Act are
being timely and fully complied with and to obtain speedy and
forceful remedial action when necessary."4
The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a showing of irreparable harm was unnecessary to
enable a private litigant to obtain injunctive relief in a suit
until his holdings exceeded 10 percent of the corporation's stock. Id. n.4. The 10
percent requirement appeared in the Williams Act as originally enacted but had been
reduced to 5 percent as a result of amendments to the Act adopted by Congress in 1970.
Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567 § 1, 84 Stat. 1497.
' 95 S. Ct. at 2073.
T Id. at 2074.
Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
:'Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1016-17.
' Id. at 1017. One judge dissented, taking the position that no violation of the
Williams Act had occurred. Id.
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under § 13(d) of the Williams Act and ordered reinstatement
of the district court's judgment.12 The Court took the position
that the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act were intended only to insure that the incumbent management of a
target company would have an opportunity "to express and
explain its position."43 It held that Rondeau's failure to timely
file the Schedule 13D had not disadvantaged the company in
meeting this need, since Rondeau had not as yet attempted to
obtain control of Mosinee Paper Corporation. 4 The Court
noted that Rondeau had filed a proper, although late, Schedule
13D and that there was no suggestion that he would fail to keep
current the information contained in the Schedule, as required
by the Act.45 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the usual requirement for injunctive relief, that there be " 'some cognizable danger of recurrent violation,'" was not met.4
The Supreme Court's decision that a mere technical violation of the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, without more, is not enough to authorize injunctive relief,4" should
offer considerable comfort to those caught in an inadvertent
failure to meet Schedule 13D filing deadlines. Such oversight
is a real possibility since the filing requirements under Section
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act have been less well known
in the corporate world, at least until recently, than similar
filing requirements for the making of tender offers under Sec1195 S.
13 Id.

Ct. at 2079.

at 2076.
11Id. The district court had accepted Rondeau's assertion that he had not considered obtaining control of Mosinee Paper Corp. until some time after the date he
became aware of his obligation to file a Schedule 13D. 354 F. Supp. at 690. In his
Schedule 13D, Rondeau stated that he and his associates "'presently propose to seek
to acquire additional common stock of the Issuer in order to obtain effective control of
the Issuer, but such investments as originally determined were and are not necessarily
made with this objective in mind.'" 95 S. Ct. at 2073.
" 95 S. Ct. at 2076.
" Id. at 2076. The quotation by the Court was from its opinion in United States
v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
" The decision was 6-3. Mr. Justice Marshall dissented without opinion. Mr.
Justice Brennan wrote a short dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Douglas joined,
urging that the violation of the Williams Act itself be treated as establishing the
actionable harm justifying injunctive relief, since this would better carry out the perceived congressional objective of providing investors and management with notice of
the potential for shifts in control at the earliest possible moment. Id. at 2079.
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tion 14(d) of that Act,4 8 which were also added by the Williams
Act amendments.49
CorporateMismanagement Suits

C.

The third Supreme Court case, BangorPunta Operations,
Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock Railroad Co.,"0 contains.significant
implications for controlling interests in a corporation who attempt to sue former owners in the corporate name for alleged
misconduct while in control of the corporation. In this case,
Amoskeag Co., as purchaser of substantially all the outstanding stock of Bangor & Aroostock Railroad Co. [hereinafter referred to as BAR], 5' brought suit in the name of BAR against
Bangor Punta alleging various acts of corporate waste and mismanagement under both federal and state law.52 The district
court granted Bangor Punta's motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the action. 53 It determined that Amoskeag would
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
In a 1971 decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals referred to § 13(d) as
"a largely unnoticed provision added in 1968 by the Williams Act." GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). For a
general overview of § 13(d) and its implications for holders, sellers and purchasers of
securities, see Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 13D: Wild Card in The Takeover Deck,
27 Bus. LAw. 1107 (1972).
cO417 U.S. 703 (1974). Other recent Supreme Court decisions of significance affecting corporation law include: Cort v. Ash, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975) (private damage suits
not authorized under the federal law placing a ban on corporate political contributions); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975) (shares of
stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in a state subsidized and supervised
nonprofit housing cooperative not "securities" within the meaning of the securities
acts); United States v. Park, 95 S. Ct. 1903 (1975)(corporate president criminally liable
for his corporation's violation of the sanitary provisions of the federal food and drug
laws).
51 Amoskeag had acquired 98.3 percent of BAR stock through its purchase from
Bangor Punta and later acquired additional shares which increased its ownership to
more than 99 percent of BAR's outstanding stock.
12 The factual statement in the text is a simplified version of the transactions.
Amoskeag had purchased a 98.3 percent interest in BAR from Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Bangor Punta Corp. Several years previously,
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. had acquired its 98.3 percent interest in BAR by purchasing all the assets of Bangor & Aroostock Corp., a holding company of BAR. The
suit was brought by BAR and its wholly owned subsidiary, Bangor Investment Co.,
against Bangor Punta Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Bangor Punta Operations, Inc.
51Bangor & Aroostock R.R. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 353-F. Supp. 724
(N.D. Me. 1972).
'
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have been barred from maintaining a stockholder's derivative
suit under the "contemporaneous ownership" requirement
imposed by both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and
state law55 and held that equitable principles precluded allowing Amoskeag "to accomplish indirectly what it could not do
directly."56 The trial court found that Amoskeag, as the real
beneficiary of any recovery, had not been damaged by Bangor
Punta's alleged wrongful conduct, and therefore should not be
allowed to benefit from a corporate recovery.5 7 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, stressing that the quasi-public nature of BAR and the existence of a strong public interest in
promoting the financial health of the nation's railroads were
sufficient to offset any personal benefit which Amoskeag might
enjoy from a corporate recovery.58 The Supreme Court, in a 54 decision, reversed the court of appeals, holding that since
Amoskeag would have been precluded from bringing a stockholder's derivative suit under the "tainted shares" doctrine,"
it should not be permitted to circumvent the equitable policy
11See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, which provides that in a derivative action the complaint shall allege, among other things: "[T]hat the plaintiff was a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or
membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law ...."
11See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 627(1)(A) (1974). Although this Act did
not become effective until after the present suit was brought, the federal district court
assumed prior Maine law would have applied the "contemporaneous ownership" rule,
since there were no Maine cases to the contrary. 353 F. Supp. at 727. The majority of
the states today have adopted the "contemporaneous ownership" rule either by decision or statute. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.15(2) n.6 (2d ed. 1975). The
present Kentucky Business Corporation Act adopts the "contemporaneous ownership"
requirement. See KRS § 271A.245, which states in part:
No derivative action shall be brought in this state in the right of a
domestic or foreign corporation by a person claiming ownership of shares of
the corporation or voting trust certificates therefor unless the plaintiff was
an owner of shares or of voting trust certificates therefor at the time of the
transaction of which he complains, or his shares or voting trust certificates
thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law from a person who owned
them at such time . ...
11353 F. Supp. at 728.
57Id.

58Bangor & Aroostock R.R. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 482 F.2d 865 (1st
Cir. 1973).

11The "tainted shares" doctrine is predicated on the proposition that subsequent
purchasers of stock stand in the shoes of their transferor. See 13 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5980 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1970).
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reflected in that doctrine by bringing suit in the name of BAR.8"
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Powell, also expressed concern that Amoskeag would receive a windfall if it
were allowed to maintain the corporate suit."
Although Bangor Punta turned on equitable considerations, the Court's restrictive attitude concerning suits in the
corporate name where policy considerations preclude a derivative suit suggests that the "contemporaneous ownership" rule
might be enough in itself to bar suits in the corporate name by
purchasers of controlling interests. 2 Indeed, such a position has
already been taken by the New York Court of Appeals as to
New York's "contemporaneous ownership" requirement. 3
While it may well be that Bangor Puntashould not be read this
broadly, 4 if the New York view gains further acceptance, it
11The Court

relied heavily on the opinion written by Dean (then Commissioner)
Pound for the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W.
1024 (Neb. 1903), in which he held that equitable considerations precluded a suit in
the corporate name by shareholders who had purchased their shares from the alleged
wrongdoers, and who would in effect be recovering a large portion of the purchase price
if a corporate recovery were permitted. 417 U.S. at 711.
In Bangor Punta, Mr. Justice Marshall wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion in
which he questioned whether Amoskeag would recover a windfall if the corporate suit
were allowed. He noted that there was no indication in the record that Amoskeag was
aware of Bangor Punta's alleged wrongful conduct when it set the purchase price of
the BAR stock. Furthermore, he thought a windfall was unlikely in view of the power
of a court of equity to impose restrictions on the use BAR could make of any money
recovered. Id. at 723-25. Justice Marshall argued that even if Amoskeag recovered a
windfall, there were still the railroad's creditors to be considered, as well as the public's
interest in the financial health of the country's railroads. Id. at 725-28. He distinguished Barber on the ground that in Barber the purchaser had acquired all the
company's stock, whereas in Bangor Punta there were still a number of minority
stockholders eligible to bring a derivative suit, even though Amoskeag held over 99%
of the BAR stock. Id. at 720-22.
11The Court pointed out that Amoskeag had paid $5,000,000 for the BAR stock,
and that if BAR were allowed to recover the $7,000,000 claimed as damages resulting
from the wrongful acts of the former owner, Bangor Punta, it would result in Amoskeag
recouping the entire purchase price it had paid for the stock plus an additional
$2,000,000. 417 U.S. at 716.
1 Arguably, the "contemporaneous ownership" requirement as embodied in both
Rule 23.1 and state laws is grounded on policy considerations peculiar to the derivative
suit and is, therefore, not relevant to suits brought in the corporate name. See 3B J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.1.15 (2d ed. 1975). Those policy considerations relate
to the collusive transfer of shares to confer federal jurisdiction and to the bringing of
"strike" suits. Id.
11 Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (App. Div.) aff'd, 98
N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1951).
11One commentator has suggested that: "The Court's refusal to apply formal
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could reduce even further the opportunities for controlling interests to bring private lawsuits seeking recovery for corporate
wrongdoing on the part of former owners. Whatever the implications of the Bangor Punta decision may be, "the Supreme
Court rejected an opportunity to expand this use of private
actions" by refusing to permit the corporation to maintain the
suit.,5
II.

A.

STATE CORPORATION LAW

Involuntary Dissolution

Turning to recent developments in corporation law at the
state level, court-ordered dissolution at the request of minority
stockholders continues to produce a steady flow of litigation,
particularly in the context of the close corporation. Courts of
equity traditionally have been reluctant to entertain suits by
stockholders to dissolve a corporation in the absence of statutory authorization.6 As a result of this judicial reluctance, corporation statutes today typically grant a majority of the stockholders the power to voluntarily dissolve the corporation."
Such statutory provisions do not, of course, aid the minority
stockholder who wants to sever an unsatisfactory relationship
with the majority by securing a dissolution of the corporation.
More recently, however, courts have been less hesitant to grant
relief to minority interests if the grounds for dissolution are
sufficiently serious, such as where there are charges of fraudulent or oppressive conduct by the controlling interests." In adcontemporaneous-shareholder requirements demonstrated tacit recognition of the limited role of derivative-suit requirements." Comment, 1 J. CORP. L. 186, 193 (1975).
5 The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 227 (1974).
" See Israels, The Sacred Cow of CorporateExistence: Problems of Deadlock and

Dissolution, 19 U. CH. L. REV. 778 (1952).
11 See, e.g., KRS § 271A.410 (voluntary dissolution by incorporators); KRS §
271A.415 (voluntary dissolution by consent of shareholders); KRS § 271A.420 (voluntary dissolution by act of the corporation).
66 See Liebert v. Clapp, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963), in which the
New York Court of Appeals recognized its power as a court of equity to dissolve a
corporation at the request of minority stockholders where the dominant stockholders
or directors were charged with "looting" the corporate assets or managing the corporation for their own special benefit. The court said: "Although there is no explicit statutory authority for the relief of dissolution sought in this action, the entire court is
agreed that it is available as a matter of judicial sponsorship." 196 N.E.2d at 542, 247
N.Y.S.2d at 104. Later, however, in Kruger v. Gerth, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1
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dition, there are now special statutory provisions in a number
of states recognizing such conduct as sufficient grounds for
court-ordered dissolution at the request of minority stockholders.69
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia, Baylor
v. Beverly Book Co.," illustrates the impact which these new
statutory provisions can have in protecting the interests of minority stockholders. The Virginia corporation statute confers
jurisdiction on the courts in a stockholder action when it is
established: "That the acts of the directors or those in control
of the corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent, "' 7'1 or
7' 2 "That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
The plaintiff, Baylor, complained of the conduct of his coshareholder, Dixon, which he considered to be domineering and
oppressive," and asked that the corporation be liquidated."
The corporation and Dixon defended by asserting that under
the bylaws of the corporation any individual stockholder wishing to sell his stock was required to give the corporation or the
remaining stockholders a "first option" to purchase at par
value,7 5 and that, since they were willing to pay Baylor this
amount for his stock, the dissolution statute did not apply.7 6
The trial court upheld this contention and ordered the suit
dismissed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding
(1965), the court refused to extend the Liebert doctrine to a case in which the minority
stockholder based his request for dissolution on economic hardship resulting from the
inability of the corporation to earn an adequate return on his investment.
" See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 97 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL AcT.
70 216 S.E.2d 18 (Va. 1975).
7 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(a)(2) (Interim Supp. 1975).

at § 13.1-94(a)(4).
13There were charges that Dixon had ignored the separate corporate existence by
failing to hold meetings of the directors and stockholders, that he had operated the
corporation to suit his own ends without following proper corporate procedure, and that
he had made interest-free loans of corporate funds to himself without appropriate
corporate action at a time when the corporation was borrowing money from commercial
lending institutions. 216 S.E.2d at 18.
11Actually, Dixon requested alternatively that either the corporation be liquidated or that the court award other appropriate relief. Id.
11The bylaws provided: "'Any individual stockholder desiring to sell his stock,
either in whole or part, must first give, in writing, the corporation, or remaining
stockholders, the opportunity to purchase such stock at par value.'" Id. at 18-19.
72 Id.

11Id. at 19.
77Id.
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that the bylaw provision was inapplicable because Baylor was
seeking not to sell his stock, but to obtain the relief which the
statute had provided for stockholders who complained of oppressive conduct or waste of corporate assets." The court
stated: "This statute is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed . . . .It provides an additional remedy for the
protection of the rights of stockholders, particularly minority
79
stockholders."
This Virginia case, based as it was on the provisions of the
Virginia corporation statute pertaining to involuntary dissolution, provides an interesting contrast to the position in which
Kentucky courts would find themselves if confronted with a
similar request for dissolution by a minority stockholder in a
Kentucky corporation. In adopting the provisions of the Model
Business Corporation Act on involuntary dissolution," which
are comparable to those contained in the Virginia statute,'
Kentucky deleted the word "oppressive" from the paragraph
authorizing dissolution for "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent"
conduct, 2 and deleted completely the paragraph authorizing
dissolution when corporate assets are being misapplied or
wasted. 3 This was done chiefly, it appears, because of concern
that the omitted provisions might enable minority interests to
interfere with the majority's legitimate efforts to conduct the
business of the corporation. 4 Furthermore, the word "oppressive" as a basis for stockholder complaint was apparently
thought to be too loose a term to tame judicially, as compared
with such traditional concepts as "illegal" or "fraudulent."' ' 5 It
78 Id. at 19-20.
70 Id. at 19.
goMODEL Acr §

97.

It The Model Act was used as a basis for the drafting of a new Virginia Stock
Corporation Act in 1956. See Gibson, The Virginia CorporationLaw of 1956, 42 VA. L.
REV. 445, 448 (1956).
82KRS § 271A.475(1)(a)2.
"' MODEL AcT § 97(a)(4).
' This was the impression the author carried away with him as a result of his
membership on the special legislative advisory committee which reviewed the
proposed new corporation statute before its final adoption by the Kentucky General
Assembly during the 1972 session. For the legislative background to the adoption of
the present Kentucky Business Corporation Act, see Ham, Kentucky Adopts a New
Business CorporationAct, 61 Ky. L.J. 73 (1972).
" For a discussion of oppression as a statutory ground for corporate dissolution,
see Comment, Oppressionas a Statutory Groundfor CorporateDissolution, 1965 DUKE
L.J. 128.
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is not altogether clear, therefore, that the type of conduct alleged in the Baylor case would provide a basis for a decree of
involuntary dissolution under the Kentucky Business Corporation Act.86 To the extent that it does not, it underscores the
more limited and conservative approach to involuntary disso87
lution which may result under the Kentucky statute.
B. Appraisal Remedy
A recent Arizona case, Waite v. Old Tucson Development
Co.,8 serves to illustrate the strict interpretation which
courts give to the procedural steps required under modem
corporation statutes for dissenting stockholders to perfect
their appraisal rights.89 The Waites, a husband and wife who
owned 1,626 shares of common stock in Old Tucson Development Company, an Arizona corporation, objected to a proposed merger of their corporation with Old Tucson Corporation, a Delaware corporation. Under the Arizona corporation
statute, a stockholder who votes to reject a merger is entitled
to be paid the fair cash value of his stock if he gives the corporation written notice of his dissent within 2 days after the consolidation meeting.9" The Waites gave written notice of their objec11While conduct which involves failure to follow internal corporate procedures or
which involves action taken to serve the selfish interests of a particular faction in the
corporation may constitute a breach of "fiduciary duty," and therefore be subject to
classification as "oppressive," it might be stretching the nature of such conduct somewhat to call it either "illegal" or "fraudulent," particularly when it is not altogether
clear such conduct could even be classified as "oppressive." For a case recognizing
conduct of this general nature as sufficiently objectionable to be "oppressive" within
the meaning of that term as used in the Illinois Business Corporation Act, see Gidwitz
v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1960). In discussing the meaning
of the word "oppressive" the Supreme Court of Illinois commented: "The word does
not necessarily savor of fraud .

. .

. It is not synonomous with 'illegal' and 'fraudu-

lent.'" 170 N.E.2d at 135. See also White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1972), in
which the Supreme Court Of Virginia made a similar observation that "oppressive"
was not synonomous with "illegal" and "fraudulent." 189 S.E.2d at 319.
81The two remaining paragraphs of the Kentucky statute on court-ordered dissolution at the request of a shareholder pertain to dissolution based on director or shareholder deadlock. See KRS §§ 271A.475(1)(a)1-3.
I 528 P.2d 1276 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
11The appraisal right is the right given to dissenting stockholders to be paid the
fair cash value of their stock in certain cases of fundamental corporate change. See H.
HENN, CORPORATIONS § 349 (2d ed. 1970). For applicable Kentucky statutory provisions, see KRS §§ 271A.400-.405.
11ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-347 (1956). The Kentucky statute requires the share-
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tions on the date the stockholders met to vote on the merger,
but they failed to vote to reject the merger proposal. The trial
court granted a motion by the defendant corporations to dismiss the complaint 9' which was affirmed on appeal.92 The court
treated the Waites' failure to vote to reject the merger as fatal
to their statutory claim to be paid the fair value of their stock.93
The Waite case, in addition to emphasizing the care which
dissenting stockholders seeking the appraisal remedy should
exercise to ensure that they have complied with all prescribed
statutory formalities, also suggests that such stockholders need
to be provided with adequate notice as to the nature of these
formalities. Although the stockholders in Waite were given notice,94 this has not been generally required under the appraisal
statutes. 5 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that corporate officers are not under any duty to volunteer such information." There is thus the real possibility that an objecting stockholder will not learn about his appraisal rights soon enough to
holder to file a written objection to the proposed action prior to or at the meeting called
to vote on the proposed matter. While it provides that he must not vote in favor of
the proposed action, it does not require that he vote to reject the proposed action, as
in the Arizona statute. See KRS § 271A.405(1). The requirement that the dissenting
shareholder vote against the proposed action is being dropped in the new Arizona
General Corporation Law, which is to become effective July 1, 1976. See Amz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 10-081 (Supp. 1975).
9' 528 P.2d at 1277.
92 Id. at 1279.
' Id. at 1278. The strict interpretation given to the statutory requirements for
appraisal is not unusual. As an illustration of how far a court may go, the Supreme
Court of Ohio denied an appraisal right to a shareholder because he made his demand
(which was required to be in writing) through an agent, and the written authority of
the agent did not accompany the demand. Klein v. United Theaters Co., 74 N.E.2d
319 (Ohio 1947). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Delaware has held that neither a
letter of transmittal enclosing a proxy form containing a vote against a merger nor the
proxy itself can satisfy the written objection required by statute. F.S. Moseley & Co.
v. Midland-Ross Corp., 179 A.2d 295 (Del. 1962).
1, 528 P.2d at 1277. The Waites had contended that the notice given was misleading in that it had stated that dissenting stockholders were required either to give a
written notice of their dissent not later than 2 days after the shareholders' meeting or
to commence an action to have the value of their shares fixed, whereas the statute
requires both these steps to be taken to perfect the right to payment. The court treated
this use of the word "or" instead of "and" in the notice as immaterial in view of the
failure of the Waites to vote as required by statute and as specified in the notice. Id.
at 1279.
92 Neither the Model Act nor the Kentucky statute contains such a requirement.
See MODEL ACT § 81; KRS § 271A.405.
11Acree v. E.I.F.C., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1973).
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comply with the statutory procedures. This possibility has
been diminished somewhat for corporations subject to the SEC
proxy regulations, which require that the proxy statement inform stockholders of their appraisal rights and the procedure
required to perfect these rights." Furthermore, some state statutes today attempt to meet this problem by mandating that
stockholders be notified of their statutory appraisal rights. 8
Notice requirements of this kind seem desirable, for the appraisal remedy cannot be a meaningful alternative to stockholders who dissent from fundamental corporate changes unless they are aware of the choices available to them.9
C.

Ultra Vires Doctrine

A recent federal case from the Southern District of Illinois,
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. McClure Quarries,Inc.,' exemplifies
the care needed to understand the scope and application of
modern corporation statutes directed at the ultra vires doctrine.'' McClure involved application of the ultra vires section
of the Illinois Business Corporation Act. ' Since the Illinois
provision was the source of a similar section in the Model Business Corporation Act, 0 3 it is therefore ultimately the source of
the ultra vires section in the present Kentucky Business Corporation Act.10 The essence of the provision is that the defense
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1975).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(f)(1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 805 (Supp.

1967)(merger and consolidation); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1311 (Supp. 1967)(sale of
assets).
11The Kentucky Court of Appeals has made it clear that a corporation must be
able to produce adequate proof that the notice of a meeting called to vote on a merger
was mailed to the stockholders, and it must be careful to comply with the statutory
requirement that the notice adequately state the purpose of the meeting. Acree v.
E.I.F.C., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1973). In this case the notice referred to action by

the stockholders to ratify a "plan of reorganization" but made no mention of a proposed merger. The court treated this as inadequate to convey notice of a merger and
insufficient to absolve objecting stockholders from compliance with the statutory requirements relating to filing written objection before the meeting and demanding

payment for their shares within 20 days after the meeting. Id. at 46-47.
' 376 F. Supp. 293 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
,02
The term "ultra vires" is used to refer to transactions engaged in by a corporation which are foreign to its purposes or powers as stated in its articles of incorporation.
See 7 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3399 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1970).
R2 ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 157.8 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
10 MODEL AcT

§ 7.

10KRS § 271A.035.
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of ultra vires is abolished in private transactions between a
corporation and third parties but may be raised in a proceeding
by: (1) a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the
transaction, or (2) the corporation against its officers or directors, or (3) the state to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin it
from transacting unauthorized business. 05
There has been a tendency to confuse the ultra vires doctrine, which concerns corporate capacity or power, with the authority of corporate officers to act, which involves agency law,
06
and to treat the latter as a facet of the ultra vires doctrine.
The court's opinion in McClure suggests how easy it is to overlook this distinction. The plaintiff surety company sued the
defendant corporation, a company engaged in the business of
quarrying, to recover on certain indemnity agreements which
two of the corporation's executive officers, Lynch and Shanks,
had executed on its behalf. The indemnity agreements were
designed to protect the plaintiff from losses it might sustain
from the issuance of performance bonds covering highway
construction projects contracted by two other corporations in
Id. The complete provision in the Kentucky statute reads:
No act of a corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal
property to or by a corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the
corporation was without capacity or power to do such act or to make or
receive such conveyance or transfer, but such lack of capacity or power may
be asserted:
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin
the doing of any act or the transfer of real or personal property by or to the
corporation. If the unauthorized act or transfer sought to be enjoined is
being, or is to be, performed or made pursuant to a contract to which the
corporation is a party, the court may, if all of the parties to the contract are
parties to the proceeding and if it deems the same to be equitable, set aside
and enjoin the performance of such contract, and in so doing may allow to
the corporation or to the other parties to the contract, as the case may be,
compensation for the loss or damage sustained by either of them which may
result from the action of the court in setting aside and enjoining the performance of such contract, but anticipated profits to be derived from the performance of the contract shall not be awarded by the court as a loss or damage
sustained;
(2) In a proceeding by the corporation, whether acting directly or
through a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, or through shareholders in a representative suit, against the incumbent or former officers or
directors of the corporation;
(3) In a proceeding by the attorney general to dissolve the corporation,
or in a proceeding by the attorney general to enjoin the corporation from the
transaction of unauthorized business.
,o See 7 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONs 3401 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1970).
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which Lynch and Shanks were also executive officers. The defendant corporation interposed as defenses the corporation's
lack of power to enter into the indemnity agreements and the
officers' lack of authority to execute the agreements on behalf of the corporation. The court granted the plaintiffs motion
to strike these defenses as insufficient under the Illinois statute
abolishing the defense of ultra vires.107
In reaching its decision, the court commented: "[A] person who deals with agents of a corporation, who have been
vested with apparent authority to act for that corporation,
should be protected against loss in the event that the agent
does, in fact, exceed his apparent authority in his dealings with
such persons."'' 8 To the extent that this was an attempt by the
court to describe the concept of apparent authority as it relates
to the power of agents to bind their principals in excess of their
actual authority, it states an accepted principle of agency law
and is relevant to the second defense raised by the corporation." 9 However, the insufficiency of this second defense would
not be due to the statutory abolition of the defense of ultra
vires; the defense would be insufficient because of the presence
of evidence sufficient to establish the existence of apparent
authority of the officers to act for the corporation. The statute
dealing with the defense of ultra vires would be relevant only
to the first defense, which was based on the corporation's lack
of power to execute the indemnity agreements. Thus, although
the court may have reached the correct result as to the validity
of each defense, it would have been helpful if it had confined
its reference to the ultra vires doctrine to the first defense based
on the corporation's lack of capacity or power to act. This is a
distinction which should be made in the interest of clear interpretation and application of the ultra vires doctrine. Although
it may be evident in a given case that a corporation has the
'IT
376 F. Supp. at 295.
' Id. at 296.
'
For a definition of apparent authority, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
8 (1957). That the second defense was understood to be related to the authority of the
two corporate officers, Lynch and Shanks, to bind the corporation on the indemnity
agreements is borne out by the corporation's answers to interrogatories, which stated
"[tihat no indemnity agreement which would obligate McClure could be executed
without a resolution of its Board of Directors authorizing such an agreement." 376 F.
Supp. at 296 n.3.
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power under its articles of incorporation to act in certain respects, it may not be nearly as evident that a particular
corporate officer is entitled to exercise that power on behalf of
the corporation.' It does not appear, therefore, that the statutory provision abolishing the defense of ultra vires should preclude the defense based on lack of officer authority, unless the
language of the statute is broad enough to encompass the latter
defense as well."'
As a final comment, it may be observed that the section
on ultra vires in the present Kentucky Business Corporation
Act is new to Kentucky law, not having appeared in previous
Kentucky corporation statutes.' The new provision should
prove to be a valuable addition to Kentucky corporation law
by helping to prevent the possible use of the ultra vires defense
as a device to avoid liability on an otherwise legitimate agreement, properly executed on the corporation's behalf."'
"I For a case making this distinction under Texas law, see In re Westec Corp.,
434 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1970). Referring to the section on ultra vires in the Texas
Business Corporation Act, the court remarked: "[This section], which ends the corporate defense of incapacity, refers to acts beyond the charter authority of the corporation
rather than beyond the authority of particular officers of the corporation." Id. at 201.
il The California statute contains a provision broad enough to cover both defenses. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 803(b)(1955) states:
No limitation upon the business, purposes, or powers of the corporation
or upon the powers of the shareholders, officers, or directors, or the manner
of exercise of such powers, contained in or implied by the articles . . . shall
be asserted as between the corporation or any shareholder and any third
person.
"2 The reference here is to previous general corporation statutes. A provision on
ultra vires similar to that which now appears in the Kentucky Business Corporation
Act has been a part of the Kentucky Nonprofit Corporation Act since its enactment
in 1968. See KRS § 273.173.
113For a comprehensive treatment of the ultra vires doctrine as affected by corporation statutes, see Ham, Ultra Vires Contracts UnderModern CorporateLegislation,
46 Ky. L.J. 215 (1958).

